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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GOLDBERG, Judge: 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case reviews whether a provision in an insurance 
policy is ambiguous. Upon review of the relevant case law 
and the tenets of contract construction, we find there are 
two reasonable interpretations of the policy language. 
Therefore, pursuant to Delaware law, we conclude that the 
provision is ambiguous, and we construe it in favor of the 
insured. We remand the case to the District Court for 
further findings in accordance with this decision. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
This case addresses whether particular language 
contained in a "personal injury" provision of a 
comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policy is 
ambiguous. The CGL policy at issue is a standard form 
policy prepared by the Insurance Service Office ("ISO"). It 
provides that the insurer will defend and indemnify the 
insured against claims alleging damages for "personal 
injury." The personal injury offenses covered under the 
policy include definition 10(c), which reads as follows: 
 
       10. "Personal injury" means injury, other than "bodily 
       injury," arising out of one or more of the following 
       offenses: . . . 
 
       c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, 
       or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
       room, dwelling or premises that a person 
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       occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or 
       lessor. 
 
App. of Appellant, at A141 (CGL Policy No. GL 590-62-18- 
RA). 
 
The above language gave rise to a declaratory judgment 
action brought on October 21, 1996 by New Castle County, 
Delaware ("the county") in the District Court for the District 
of Delaware against National Union Fire Insurance 
Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("National").1 Between 
1991 and 1994, the county purchased a series of CGL 
policies from National (collectively "the CGL policy" or "the 
policy").2 When Frank E. Acierno, a developer, filed three 
lawsuits against the county (collectively, "the Acierno 
actions"), the county turned to National to defend and 
indemnify it against the suits. In general, the Acierno 
actions alleged that the county violated Acierno's 
constitutional rights by re-zoning or refusing to issue 
building permits for his property. More specifically, the 
actions were styled as follows: (1) the first suit alleged 
violations of Acierno's constitutional rights for failure to 
issue a commercial building permit on a parcel of land 
owned by Acierno;3 (2) the second alleged that an ordinance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court based its jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. 
See 
28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1994). 
 
2. The county purchased three CGL policies from National: Policy No. GL 
590-44-26-RA, effective July 1, 1991 to July 1, 1992; Policy No. GL 590- 
62-18-RA, effective July 1, 1992 to July 1, 1993; and Policy No. GL 590- 
73-01-RA, effective July 1, 1993 to July 1, 1994. As the District Court 
noted, these policies do not differ from one another in any significant 
way. See New Castle County, Delaware v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, PA, No. CIV. A. 96-504 LON, 1997 WL 809207, at *1 n.1 (D. 
Del. Dec. 30, 1997) ("New Castle County v. National"). National has 
disclaimed coverage under Policy No. 590-44-26-RA, the one it considers 
to have been in effect when the first two actions against the county were 
filed. Br. of Appellee, at 7. National has not declared its coverage 
position 
with respect to the other two CGL policies. 
 
3. Acierno v. Mitchell, No. Civ. A. 92-384-SLR ("Acierno I"). Acierno 
moved 
for a preliminary injunction, which the trial court granted on December 
30, 1992. On appeal, this circuit held that the dispute was not ripe for 
judicial review, vacated the lower judgment, and remanded the case with 
instructions to dismiss it without prejudice. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 
F.3d 970, 977-78 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
                                3 
  
passed by the county to re-zone one of his properties 
violated his civil rights;4 and (3) the third, filed after the 
county's final denial of the building permit, essentially 
restated the same facts and violations as the first suit.5 
 
Because the county believed that the Acierno actions 
state a claim for "invasion of the right of private occupancy" 
as defined in definition 10(c) of the CGL policy, it sought to 
have National defend and indemnify it in those suits. 
National disclaimed coverage under the CGL policy for the 
Acierno actions.6 The county then filed the declaratory 
judgment action underlying this appeal. 
 
National responded to the County's declaratory judgment 
action with two counter-arguments. First, National asserted 
that the offense of "invasion of the right of private 
occupancy," as contemplated by definition 10(c), is limited 
to tangible interference with a possessory interest in 
property. Since the Acierno actions did not allege 
interference with a possessory interest, but rather with the 
use and enjoyment of land, National asserted that the 
actions do not fall within the coverage of definition 10(c) 
and, consequently, National had no obligation to defend or 
indemnify the county. Second, National argued that based 
on the "by or on behalf of" language in definition 10(c), 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Acierno v. Cloutier, No. Civ. A. 92-385-SLR ("Acierno II"). This case 
was 
disposed of by a joint stipulation approved by the District Court on 
October 24, 1997. Br. of Appellant, at 12. 
 
5. Acierno v. New Castle County, No. Civ. A. 93-579-SLR ("Acierno III"). 
This case was tried in the Spring of 1997. According to the county, it 
was required to issue a building permit and the case was eventually 
settled in accordance with the Acierno II stipulation. Br. of Appellant, 
at 
14. 
 
6. National has actually only disclaimed coverage under the CGL policy 
for Acierno I and II. Yet, the District Court concluded in its opinion 
that, 
although National has apparently not declared its official coverage 
position with regard to Acierno III, the issue of National's obligation to 
defend and indemnify the county in Acierno III was nonetheless ripe for 
adjudication, in part because it is likely that National would disclaim 
any obligation to defend or indemnify the county in connection with 
Acierno III. See New Castle County v. National, 1997 WL 809207 at *3-4. 
We have no occasion to disrupt the District Court'sfinding on this 
matter. 
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coverage is available only when the insured commits an 
"invasion" as the owner, landlord, or lessor of the property 
at issue. Since the county does not claim to be the owner, 
landlord, or lessor of any Acierno properties, National 
maintained that it had no obligation to defend the county 
in those suits. 
 
On December 30, 1997, the District Court issued an 
opinion granting summary judgment to National, holding 
that definition 10(c) unambiguously "contemplates coverage 
for acts such as evictions, entries and invasions committed 
by one acting by or on behalf of the property's owner, 
landlord or lessor." New Castle County v. National, 1997 WL 
809207, at *7. According to the District Court, the county 
cannot be considered the owner, landlord, or lessor of the 
property and therefore National had no obligation to defend 
or indemnify the county. Having thus held, the court 
explicitly declined to reach the question of whether the 
constitutional violations alleged in the Acierno actions 
"constitute an invasion of the right of private occupancy." 
New Castle County v. National, 1997 WL 809207, at *8. 
 
This appeal ensued. The county asserts that the District 
Court erred in finding that definition 10(c) only provides 
coverage for acts committed by or on behalf of an owner, 
landlord, or lessor. On appeal, the county argues that 
definition 10(c) is ambiguous and should be construed in 
its favor. The issue presented to this Court on appeal is 
thus a narrow one. In short, we must determine whether 
definition 10(c) is ambiguous. 
 
Because the issue addressed in this opinion is one of first 
impression under Delaware law, we must predict how the 
Delaware Supreme Court would resolve it. After examining 
the parties' conflicting interpretations, relevant case law, 
tenets of contract construction, and the policy's language 
and purpose as a whole, we conclude that definition 10(c) 
is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the county. 
Like the District Court we, too, will not reach the question 
of whether the allegations made in the Acierno actions state 
a colorable claim for an invasion of the right of private 
occupancy. Accordingly, the District Court's determination 
that definition 10(c) is unambiguous will be reversed, and 
this case will be remanded to the District Court to 
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determine, in light of our holding, whether the violations 
alleged in the Acierno actions constitute an invasion of the 
right of private occupancy. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Scope and Standard of Review 
 
We assert jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Jurisdiction below was premised on diversity of 
citizenship, and the District Court properly applied the 
substantive law of Delaware. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Since the Delaware Supreme Court has 
yet to address the issue presented by this appeal, we must 
predict how that court would decide it. See Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The issue before this Court, simply put, is whether 
definition 10(c) is ambiguous. Whether an insurance policy 
is ambiguous is a question of law, see International Union 
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 917 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), and 
we have plenary review over the issue. See Pacific Indem. 
Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985)). And, as a 
general rule, we will consider only issues passed upon by 
the court below. See, e.g., Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 
718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
B. Delaware Law on Interpreting Insurance Policies 
 
As we must predict how the Delaware Supreme Court 
would decide this issue, it is necessary that wefirst 
understand Delaware law on this matter. Before an insurer 
is obligated to defend or indemnify a policyholder, the 
insured must demonstrate that coverage is available under 
the policy. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and 
Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1181 (3d Cir. 1991) ("New 
Castle v. Hartford I") (applying Delaware law). An insurer's 
duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify, see 
Charles E. Brohawn & Bros., Inc. v. Employers Commercial 
Union Insurance Co., 409 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Del. 1979), but 
"is limited to suits which assert claims for which it has 
assumed liability under the policy." Continental Cas. Co. v. 
Alexis I. duPont School Dist., 317 A.2d 101, 103 (Del. 1974). 
"[W]here there exists some doubt as to whether the 
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complaint against the insured alleges a risk insured 
against, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
insured." Id. at 105. Most importantly therefore, an insurer 
is "required to defend any action which potentially states a 
claim which is covered under the policy." New Castle 
County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 
1359, 1367 (D. Del. 1987) ("New Castle v. Hartford II"). 
Thus, in this case, if the Acierno actions potentially state a 
claim that is covered under definition 10(c), National is 
required to defend the county in those actions. 
 
Whether the Acierno actions potentially state a claim for 
which National has assumed liability depends upon how we 
interpret definition 10(c). As a basic matter, Delaware law 
requires us to interpret insurance contracts "in a common 
sense manner." SI Management L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 
37, 42 (Del. 1998); see also New Castle v. Hartford I, 933 
F.2d at 1189 (according the terms of an insurance policy 
their "ordinary, usual meaning"). We must also examine the 
disputed language in the context of the entire policy. See, 
e.g., New Castle v. Hartford I, 933 F.2d at 1194 
(ascertaining whether a term "is ambiguous in the context 
of a specific insurance policy"); New Castle County v. 
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267, 1271 (3d 
Cir. 1991) ("New Castle v. Hartford III") (construing a term 
"in context with the function of the [insurance] policy"); see 
also Porter v. Pathfinder Servs., Inc., 683 A.2d 40, 42 (Del. 
1996) (construing language of an employment contract in 
its context as a whole). 
 
"Absent some ambiguity, Delaware courts will not destroy 
or twist policy language under the guise of construing it," 
Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Co. v. American Motorists 
Insurance Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del. 1992) (citation 
omitted), because "creating an ambiguity where none exists 
could, in effect, create a new contract with rights, liabilities 
and duties to which the parties ha[ve] not assented." 
Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 
926 (Del. 1982) (citations omitted). When policy language is 
ambiguous, however, under Delaware law this Court must 
apply the doctrine of contra proferentem. See Oglesby v. 
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Del. 
1994) (applying Delaware law). That is, ambiguous 
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language must be construed against the drafter and in 
conformance with the reasonable expectations of the 
insured. See Swfte Int'l, Ltd. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 
Civ. A. 94-44-SLR, 1994 WL 827812, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 
1994); see also Steigler v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398, 
400 (Del. 1978). 
 
The premise underlying the principle of contra 
proferentem is that an insurance contract is one of 
adhesion. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 
320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974). As the Delaware Supreme 
Court recently explained, 
 
       [T]he insurer . . . is the entity in control of the process 
       of articulating the terms [of an insurance contract]. The 
       other party . . . usually has very little to say about 
       those terms except to take them or leave them or to 
       select from limited options offered by the insurer. . . . 
       Therefore, it is incumbent upon the dominant party to 
       make the terms clear. Convoluted or confusing terms 
       are the problem of the insurer . . . -- not the insured 
       . . . . 
 
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1149-50 
(Del. 1997). As noted earlier, due to the insurer's dominant 
position, when an ambiguity is found in insurance policy 
language, we must construe the language against the 
insurer as a matter of Delaware law. And therefore, unlike 
with other types of contracts, we need not inquire into the 
parties' actual intent. See New Castle v. Hartford I, 933 
F.2d at 1182 n. 43; Oglesby, 877 F. Supp. at 881 (noting 
that "Delaware courts . . . consistently constru[e] 
ambiguities in favor of the insured as a matter of law."). 
 
Because ambiguous language is construed against the 
insurer as a matter of law, we take special note of Delaware 
law for determining whether language is ambiguous."The 
settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in 
controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different 
interpretations or may have two or more different 
meanings." Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). An insurance policy is not 
ambiguous, however, "merely because two conflicting 
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interpretations may be suggested. Rather, both 
interpretations must reflect a reasonable reading of the 
contractual language." Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Kenner, 
570 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del. 1990). Thus, we must examine, 
not only whether the county's reading of definition 10(c) is 
possible, but also whether it is reasonable. See id.; see also 
New Castle v. Hartford III, 970 F.2d at 1271 (rejecting one 
reading of the policy language at issue because, while 
possible, it was not reasonable). 
 
C. Definition 10(c) is Ambiguous 
 
Against this backdrop of Delaware law, we turn to the 
task before us of determining whether definition 10(c) is 
ambiguous. First, we consider the respective arguments of 
the parties and the relevant case law. We attempt to 
balance the weight of authority on this precise issue, but 
find that additional guidance is needed. Consequently, we 
turn to the tenets of contract construction. Finally, we 
examine the disputed language within the policy as a 
whole. Using these tools, we conclude that definition 10(c) 
is ambiguous. 
 
National and the county assert different interpretations of 
the phrase "by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor." 
National argues, and the District Court held, that the 
phrase can only mean that the wrongful act -- the eviction, 
entry or invasion -- was done "by or on behalf of [the 
premises'] owner." The county replies that it is equally 
logical, or at least reasonable, to interpret the phrase as 
explaining how the premises in question is occupied. In its 
view, the language indicates that the "room, dwelling or 
premises" must have been occupied "by or on behalf of its 
owner, landlord or lessor." This distinction is critical 
because the county's reading does not require that the 
wrongful act have been instigated by the "owner, landlord 
or lessor" of the premises while National's does. As the 
county clearly was not an "owner, landlord or lessor" of 
Acierno's property, the latter interpretation is the only one 
under which the county can claim coverage. 
 
1. National's Interpretation of Definition 10(c) 
 
Under National's construction, to qualify for coverage, the 
invasion offense must be committed "by or on behalf of " 
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the owner, the landlord, or lessor. Applied to the facts in 
this case, National would be obligated to defend the county 
against claims of invasion only if the county were the 
owner, landlord, or lessor of the property at issue in the 
Acierno actions. 
 
In support of this position, National cites three cases: (1) 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Goodwin, 950 F. 
Supp. 24 (D. Me. 1996); (2) Terramatrix, Inc. v. United 
States Fire Insurance Co., 939 P.2d 483 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1997); and (3) TGA Development, Inc. v. Northern Insurance 
Co. of New York, 62 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1995). National's 
citations are instructive, yet ultimately we find the 
reasoning in these cases unavailing. 
 
In Goodwin, the court held that language identical to 
definition 10(c) "unambiguously requires that the wrongful 
entry be committed by the owner, landlord, or lessor of the 
room, dwelling, or premises." 950 F. Supp. at 27. We fail to 
understand the logic underlying Goodwin, however. 
Reviewing the same phrase, i.e., 
 
       [t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or 
       invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, 
       dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on 
       behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor, 
 
the Goodwin court found that the word "its" modifies "room, 
dwelling or premises," and not "person." 950 F. Supp. at 
27. Yet, replacing "its" with any of the words the court 
found "its" to modify does not foreclose either National or 
the county's reading of the provision. For example, consider 
the following: "The wrongful eviction from a room that a 
person occupies by or on behalf of the room's owner, 
landlord or lessor." Or, consider this: "The invasion of the 
right of private occupancy of a premises that a person 
occupies by or on behalf of the premises' owner, landlord or 
lessor." Both examples illustrate the flaw in the Goodwin 
court's reasoning; that is, neither clarifies whether "by or 
on behalf of " requires the offense to be committed by the 
owner, landlord, or lessor, or whether it defines the 
possessory interest of the claimant. Thus, determining what 
"its" modifies neither strengthens nor undermines either of 
the competing interpretations of definition 10(c) forwarded 
by National and the county. 
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In Terramatrix, the Colorado Court of Appeals also found 
language identical to definition 10(c) "unambiguous and 
applicable only to entries, evictions and invasions 
committed by or on behalf of the owner, landlord or lessor." 
939 P.2d at 489. Although the Terramatrix court professed 
to be "persuaded by the reasoning of other courts," it cited 
only Goodwin in support of its conclusion that the provision 
was unambiguous. Id. As we explained above, the 
reasoning in Goodwin is flawed at best. Because the 
Terramatrix court does not offer any analysis of its own, 
without more, we cannot accord significant weight to its 
holding. 
 
In TGA Development, the Eighth Circuit commented that 
it "doubt[ed] very much that coverage is available under" a 
personal injury provision identical to definition 10(c) 
because the insured could not "even colorably be 
characterized as owner, landlord, or lessor." TGA 
Development, 62 F.3d at 1091 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). National points to this language to bolster its 
claim that the insured must be the owner, landlord, or 
lessor to qualify for coverage under definition 10(c). The 
Eighth Circuit's commentary is purely dicta, however. 
Indeed, the TGA court explicitly "pass[ed] over" the issue 
presented by this appeal. See id. Instead, the court based 
its conclusion that coverage was not available on the 
policy's exclusion of coverage clause prohibiting recovery 
"for personal injury for which the insured has assumed 
liability in a contract or agreement." See 62 F.3d at 1091. 
The dicta from TGA Development has "no binding authority" 
on this Court. Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 
967 (3d Cir. 1990).7 
 
In addition to the above cases, the District Court also 
cited Patel v. Northfield Insurance Co., 940 F. Supp. 995 
(N.D. Tex. 1996), for the proposition that definition 10(c) is 
unambiguous. In Patel, the court found that language 
identical to definition 10(c) was unambiguous. The case is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We can, of course, accord dicta as much weight as we deem 
appropriate. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d 159, 
162 (3d Cir. 1947) (recognizing that although a finding was dicta, it was 
"made after a careful consideration of authorities"). 
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different in one fundamental respect, however. The Patel 
court based its finding on Decorative Center v. Employers 
Casualty, 833 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App. 1992), which 
examines language different from definition 10(c). In 
Decorative Center, the personal injury offense was "other 
invasion of the right of private occupancy." Id. at 1001. 
Importantly, it does not include the "by or on behalf of" 
language that forms the basis for this appeal. The Patel 
court dismissed the difference between the Decorative 
Center language and language identical to definition 10(c) 
as having "no practical effect." Id. at 1001 n.10. We, 
however, find that language critical to this case. Indeed, the 
sole focus of this appeal is definition 10(c)'s "by or on behalf 
of" language.8 
 
In sum, National has offered some authority that 
suggests definition 10(c) is not ambiguous. Upon close 
inspection of the cases, however, we find the authority to be 
unpersuasive or of limited precedential value. As such, 
standing alone, the authority forwarded by National does 
not resolve whether definition 10(c) is clear or ambiguous. 
With that we turn to the county's interpretation of 
definition 10(c). 
 
2. The County's Competing Interpretation of Definition 
10(c) 
 
The county urges this Court to accept an alternative 
reading of definition 10(c) as reasonable. According to the 
county, the phrase "by or on behalf of" defines the 
possessory interest of the person aggrieved in 10(c). Under 
this interpretation, in order for the insured to invoke 
coverage for an invasion, the claimant must have the right 
to occupy the premises, either as owner, landlord, or lessor, 
or with the permission of the owner, landlord, or lessor. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The ISO added the "by or on behalf of" language to definition 10(c) in 
1986. Thus, in addition to Patel, we reject Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. East Central Oklahoma Electric Cooperative, 97 F.3d 383 (10th Cir. 
1996), Martin v. Brunzelle, 699 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1988), and Harbor 
Insurance Co. v. Anderson Leasing, Inc., 1989 WL 112532 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 27, 1989) as persuasive precedent, because they too are based 
on the pre-1986 version of definition 10(c). 
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In support of its interpretation, the county cites United 
States v. Security Management Co., 96 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 
1996). In that case, the Seventh Circuit examined language 
identical to definition 10(c). Although the District Court 
found the provision to be ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit 
read the language beginning "that a person occupies . . ." 
as unambiguously "refin[ing] the nature of the prerequisite 
`right' of private occupancy." Id. at 265. In other words, in 
the view of the Security Management court, the language at 
issue "limit[s] coverage to those instances where `a person 
occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor' " 
and functions to "exclude[ ] at least unapproved sub-lessees 
from coverage." Id. 
 
The Seventh Circuit's commentary on the meaning of the 
clause again is dicta, however. Its holding is based on the 
fact that the litigants claiming an invasion in that case 
"unquestionably lacked any . . . enforceable claim of 
occupancy," Id. at 265; indeed, the litigants were "testers," 
or civil rights activists who posed as apartment-hunters but 
who did not actually rent a unit. Id. at 265. As we noted 
earlier, we are not bound by this dicta, although we may 
consider it in our analysis if we deem it appropriate. See 
supra n.7. 
 
The county also cites Blackhawk - Central City Sanitation 
District v. American Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co., 856 
F. Supp. 584 (D. Colo. 1994), for the proposition that 
definition 10(c) is ambiguous. In that case, the court was 
asked to construe language identical to definition 10(c), and 
the parties' arguments mirror those presented here. 
Appellee contended that language identical to definition 
10(c) "requires that the eviction, entry or invasion be by or 
on behalf of the owner, landlord or lessor of the premises." 
Id. at 590. The appellant, on the other hand, argued that 
the provision could "be read to modify, not the party who 
evicts, enters or invades, but rather on whose authority the 
current occupant holds the property." Id. Faced with these 
competing interpretations, the court deemed the provision 
ambiguous and construed the language in favor of the 
insured. See id. The Blackhawk court, however, did not 
elaborate on how it reached its conclusion and thus 
provides us with little guidance. 
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In sum, the county has presented this Court with 
authority to suggest that definition 10(c) is ambiguous. The 
case law it cites -- Security Management and Blackhawk -- 
however, is either dicta or void of analysis and thus it does 
not, by itself, establish that definition 10(c) is ambiguous or 
that the county's interpretation is reasonable. Having 
reviewed the relevant case law supporting both sides of the 
issue, we consider the weight of the authority. 
 
3. The Weight of the Authority 
 
To predict how the Delaware Supreme Court would 
decide this case, we must consider "reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand." McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980). This includes 
"relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, [and] scholarly works." Id. Having reviewed the 
relevant precedent, it is difficult to predict how the 
Delaware Supreme Court would decide the issue before us. 
Importantly, we can discern no appreciable trend among 
the cases. First, the universe of cases that examines 
language identical to definition 10(c) is very small. While 
our job is not simply to count the number of cases on both 
sides, even if we did so, the line of cases on each side 
would be roughly equal. Moreover, one Circuit Court of 
Appeal has weighed in on each side of the issue, and each 
time only in dicta. Still other cases offered only bare-boned 
analyses. And finally, with particular relevance to our task, 
not one of the cases cited is from a Delaware state court or 
a federal court construing Delaware law. 
 
The most we can glean from the conflicting case law on 
this issue is that, as a starting point, definition 10(c) may 
reasonably be susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
When faced with a similar situation in another case, we 
explained that 
 
       [a]lthough the presence of conflicting judicial decisions 
       does not automatically mandate a finding of ambiguity, 
       we think it has some relevance. . . . We are confronted 
       here with two lines of contrasting cases . . . While it is 
       our responsibility to ascertain which of these lines is 
       most likely to be followed in Delaware, we cannot help 
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       but view such a division as at least suggesting that the 
       . . . [contested term] is susceptible of more than one 
       reasonable definition. 
 
New Castle v. Hartford I, 933 F.2d at 1196. In short, "that 
different courts have arrived at conflicting interpretations of 
the policy is strongly indicative of th[is] policy's essential 
ambiguity." Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 
(3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Thus, as a starting point, 
we tend to view the case law as indicating that definition 
10(c) is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation and, as such, is ambiguous. For greater 
guidance on this issue, we now turn to the traditional rules 
of contract interpretation. 
 
4. Rules of Contract Interpretation 
 
Insurance policy disputes often turn on the meaning of a 
single term or phrase. See, e.g., New Castle v. Hartford I, 
933 F.2d at 1193-99. The case before us is somewhat 
different because it turns on the function of a phrase -- "by 
or on behalf of" -- within a larger provision. As a 
consequence, we will look to the grammatical arrangement 
of clauses in definition 10(c) to construe the meaning of 
definition 10(c). See Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 
670 (1889) ("To get at the thought or meaning expressed in 
a statute, a contract, or a constitution, the first resort, in 
all cases, is to the natural significance of the words, in the 
order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of 
the instrument have placed them."); see also 17A Am. Jur. 
2d Contracts S 369 (1991) (instructing a court to give "due 
force to the grammatical arrangement of clauses" because 
grammatical construction of a contract "is often a reliable 
signpost" in construing its language). 
 
National argues that definition 10(c) is not ambiguous. 
The heart of its argument is that the phrase "by or on 
behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor" modifies "wrongful 
eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right 
of private occupancy," and thus requires that the insured 
be the owner, landlord or lessor of the property at issue. 
The county, on the other hand, maintains that "by or on 
behalf of" pertains to its nearer antecedent "person," 
establishing the requirement that the claimant have the 
right to occupy the premises. 
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The grammatical construction of contracts generally 
requires that a qualifying or modifying phrase be construed 
as referring to its nearest antecedent. See Bakery and 
Confectionery Union and Indus. Int'l Pension Fund v. Ralph's 
Grocery Co., 118 F.3d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(construing a collective bargaining agreement) (citation 
omitted); see also Aks v. Southgate Trust Co., 1994 WL 
171537 (D. Kansas Mar. 31, 1994), at *9 (concluding that 
the "[r]ules of grammar and contract interpretation as well 
as simple logic dictate" that a particular clause modifies the 
word directly preceding it). The Ninth Circuit applied this 
rule of contract interpretation in construing the language of 
an insurance contract in Interstate Fire and Casualty Co. v. 
Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 
1994) (applying Florida law). Under the terms of the policy, 
the underwriters agreed "to indemnify the Assured for all 
sums which the Assured shall be obligated to pay by reason 
of the liability imposed upon the Assured by law . .. for 
damages . . . on account of personal injuries . . . arising out 
of any occurrence happening during the period of 
Insurance." Id. at 1329 (ellipses in original). The insurance 
underwriter argued that the assuring clause required that 
all damages occur within the policy period in order to be 
covered. In contrast, the court concluded that "based on 
the plain meaning of the assuring clause . . . it is the 
occurrence, rather than the damages, that must happen 
during the policy period." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, in this example, "happening during the 
period of Insurance" modifies "occurrence," the noun that 
directly precedes it, and not "damages," which is more 
remote.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Gibbs v. Air Canada, applied the 
same rule of contract construction to a contract in which a company 
called Aircraft Services agreed to provide various ramp services to Air 
Canada. 810 F.2d 1529, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987). A liability provision in 
the contract stated that "Service Inc. does not assume any liability for 
damages caused by or resulting from directly or indirectly, wholly or in 
part, any failure or fault other than negligence or willful misconduct 
. . . ." Id. at 1536. Noting that the"grammatical construction of 
contracts 
generally requires that a qualifying phrase be construed as referring to 
its nearest antecedent," the court concluded that the "natural reading" of 
the phrase was that "wholly or in part" modified "caused by or resulting 
from directly or indirectly," id., the language that most directly 
preceded 
it. 
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When we apply this rule of construction to definition 
10(c), it is plain that "by or on behalf of" modifies "that a 
person occupies," the language that directly precedes it, 
and not the "wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or 
invasion of the right of private occupancy" language that 
commences definition 10(c). On this basis, we find the 
county's interpretation of definition 10(c) to be entirely 
reasonable. Because definition 10(c) is subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and must 
be construed in favor of the county.10  See supra section 
III.B. (noting that ambiguous language is construed against 
the insurer as a matter of Delaware law). 
 
Our finding that the county's interpretation of definition 
10(c) is reasonable is not diminished by the fact that this 
interpretation may render portions of the provision 
surplusage in cases of "wrongful eviction" and"wrongful 
entry." As noted earlier, under Delaware law, we must 
consider the phrase "by or on behalf of " in the context of 
definition 10(c) as a whole. See Cheseroni v. Nationwide 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We hoped that an examination of the punctuation used in definition 
10(c) might clarify any ambiguity therein. See, e.g., Plymouth Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Illinois Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. of Chicago, IL, 378 F.2d 
389, 
391 (3d Cir. 1967) (stating that "punctuation may be used as an aid in 
interpreting a contract"); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts S 370 (1991) (stating 
that "where words do not have a plain meaning, the rules of punctuation 
may be of some assistance"). We were disappointed. At oral argument, 
counsel for National represented to this Court that, in construing 
definition 10(c), one is supposed to "breathe" in between the terms "that 
a person occupies" and "by or on behalf of," presumably to break the 
natural link between the two phrases. Yet in drafting this policy, 
National could easily have inserted a comma in between "occupies" and 
"by or on behalf of" to function as an "interruption in continuity of 
thought or sentence structure." The Chicago Manual of Style (John 
Grossman ed., University of Chicago Press, 14th ed. 1993). That is, a 
comma would have alerted the reader that National did not intend for 
"by or on behalf of " to flow uninterrupted from "that a person occupies." 
National chose instead, however, to assume that the reader would 
"breathe" in between "by" and "occupies." In making this choice, National 
also assumed the risk that the language might be misconstrued. And, 
"convoluted or confusing terms are the problem of " National, not the 
county. Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 697 A.2d 742, 745 
(Del. 1997). 
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Mut. Ins. Co., 402 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Del. 1979) ("[A] single 
clause or paragraph of a contract cannot be read in 
isolation, but must be read in context, and every portion of 
the contract deserves consideration."); New Castle v. 
Hartford III, 970 F.2d at 1271 ("[A] word or term cannot be 
considered in isolation; it must be read in the semantic and 
functional context of the policy or clause at issue to 
determine if two competing, reasonable interpretations 
exist."). We have said that "by or on behalf of" is 
ambiguous because it can reasonably be interpreted to 
require the insured to commit the offense as owner, 
landlord, or lessor, or to define the possessory status of the 
claimant. It follows, then, that "wrongful eviction from a 
room . . . by or on behalf of the owner, landlord or lessor" 
can mean either that the owner, landlord, or lessor must 
commit the eviction, or that the claimant must have the 
right to possess the room.11 The latter interpretation, 
however, seems to render the term "wrongful" superfluous. 
Indeed, an eviction is not "wrongful" unless the evicted 
party (the claimant) has a right to possess the premises. 
And this Court takes care not to render other portions of a 
provision or contract superfluous when construing contract 
language. See, e.g., Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying 
Pennsylvania law); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 203(a) (1979) (stating that "an interpretation 
which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to 
all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves 
a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect"). 
 
In this vein, we note that interpreting the phrase "by or 
on behalf of" to require a claimant to have the right to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The language "a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies 
by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor" applies to all three 
offenses -- wrongful eviction, wrongful entry, and invasion of the right 
of 
private occupancy. We know this because wrongful eviction is followed 
by "from," entry by "into," and invasionby "of." "From," "into" and "of " 
are all prepositions, and as such, have an object. The objects in this 
case 
are the room, dwelling, or premises. Thus, definition 10(c) must be read, 
for example, as "wrongful eviction from a room . . . ," "wrongful entry 
into a room . . . ," or "invasion of the right of private occupancy of a 
room . . . ." 
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possess the room does not necessarily render the word 
"wrongful" surplusage. Whereas an "invasion of the right of 
private occupancy" is itself a tortious act, both evictions 
and entries can be executed rightfully. For example, a 
landlord may rightfully evict a tenant who has not paid 
rent. Thus, the word "wrongful" complements the "by or on 
behalf of" language by ensuring that coverage under 
definition 10(c) is limited to situations in which the insured 
has committed a wrongful, tortious act. As we have noted 
in the past, insurance policies are often written with an 
abundance of caution; indeed, they routinely use words or 
groups of words that are fairly synonymous with one 
another, particularly to underline a salient point. See New 
Castle v. Hartford I, 933 F.2d at 1194 & n. 56 (concluding 
that the Delaware Supreme Court would persist in giving a 
term its plain meaning even though other courts feared that 
construction rendered the term surplusage). Therefore, 
notwithstanding a potential contextual defect, we are 
unwilling to override our conclusion that the county's 
interpretation of definition 10(c) is reasonable when the 
contextual defect is itself subject to competing 
interpretations. Although we would prefer to give equal 
effect to all of the language in definition 10(c), we refuse to 
reject an otherwise reasonable reading to avoid what might 
only be a potential contextual infirmity. In sum, the 
contextual complexity of definition 10(c) only reinforces our 
conclusion that the provision is ambiguous. 
 
We also reject National's argument that its interpretation 
of definition 10(c) alone makes sense when viewed in the 
context of the entire CGL policy. It argues that the"entire 
object of the CGL policies" is "to insure against the tortious 
conduct of the insured." Br. of Appellee, at 28. We recognize 
that the Delaware Supreme Court has considered the 
"purpose of liability policies in general" to determine the 
scope of coverage. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 152, 157 (Del. 1996) (construing a CGL 
insurance policy). Contrary to National's argument, 
however, viewing "by or on behalf of " in the context of the 
entire policy does not foreclose the county's interpretation 
of definition 10(c). Indeed, the county's position that "by or 
on behalf of " requires the claimant to have the right to 
possess the premises is consistent with the purpose of the 
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policy as stated by National; the language as construed by 
the county ensures that the only claims covered under the 
policy are for tortious conduct. 
 
Furthermore, we reject National's claim that under the 
county's interpretation 
 
       there would have been no conceivable way for Appellee 
       to rate the actuarial risk involve in issuing the CGL 
       policies. . . . Appellee can only sell Appellant a policy 
       of CGL insurance if there is a readily quantifiable 
       number of properties which Appellee [sic: Appellant] 
       owns, leases or rents. If Appellant's interpretation had 
       been accepted by the parties at the time the subject 
       CGL policies were issued, the premium charged to 
       Appellant for such coverage would have been 
       astronomical since Appellant could potentially be held 
       liable for wrongfully entering or invading an ever- 
       expanding number of `rooms, dwellings, or premises' 
       within New Castle County. 
 
Br. of Appellee, at 41. In brief, National claims that its 
interpretation of definition 10(c) is the only reasonable one 
because otherwise, it would have been impossible for 
National to assess the actuarial risk involved in issuing a 
policy to the county. National's argument fails for several 
reasons. First, National claims that it would only issue a 
policy to the county if National could quantify the number 
of properties the county owned, leased, or rented. Yet, this 
Court could not find, and indeed National did not identify, 
any provision in the policy that limited the county's ability 
to buy, lease, or rent new properties while covered by the 
policy. Thus, there does not appear to be any policy 
mechanism that fixes the number of properties the county 
owns, leases, or rents within the limits supposedly 
established by the amount of the premium. 
 
Second, the invasion offense is just one of several 
personal injury offenses listed in definition 10. See App. to 
Br. of Appellant, at A141 (CGL Policy). National claims that 
without knowing the number of properties owned, leased, 
or rented by the county, it could not assess the county's 
risk for claims of eviction, entry, or invasion. Assuming that 
is true, how does National assess the county's risk for "false 
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arrest, detention, or imprisonment" without knowing how 
many people the county could falsely arrest? Or "malicious 
prosecution," without knowing how many people the county 
could potentially maliciously prosecute? And again National 
has not indicated that the policy limits the coverage of 
these personal injury offenses to a specific number. It 
seems to this Court that there are a potentially infinite 
number of people the county could libel or slander through 
an infinite number of written and oral statements, and yet 
National was able to calculate a premium to insure the 
county in connection with those offenses. 
 
Third, we must be sure to read the policy language from 
the average consumer's point of view. See New Castle v. 
Hartford I, 933 F.2d at 1190 (noting that "under Delaware 
law, the parties to an insurance contract are bound by the 
popular, lay meaning of its terms, regardless of the 
sophistication of the insured."); see also Continental Ins. Co. 
v. Burr, 706 A.2d 499, 501 (Del. 1998) (construing 
ambiguous language to satisfy the average consumer's 
expectations). The average consumer can be expected to 
appreciate that the insurer will insure a particular risk only 
under certain circumstances when those circumstances are 
explicitly spelled out in the contract. For example, it is clear 
that the insurer deems a particular event too risky for it to 
insure the policyholder against when the insurer includes a 
clause explicitly excepting that risk in the policy. This was 
the case in New Castle v. Hartford III, where we stated that 
an exclusion clause "embodies an understanding that the 
insurer will only underwrite a certain, specific risk, 
calculable to a margin of actuarial certainty and rational 
from an economic point of view for both parties." Id. at 
1272. In contrast, definition 10(c) is not an exclusion 
clause and does not "embody" a similar understanding. 
National's argument thus expects too much from the 
average insurance consumer. 
 
Lastly, and most importantly, what National intended 
definition 10(c) to mean is very different from what the 
provision's language conveys. At best, National's actuarial 
argument suggests that National has a sound business 
rationale for the interpretation of definition 10(c) it urges on 
this Court. The argument does not, however, demonstrate 
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that National succeeded in drafting a policy that limited 
coverage for the invasion offense only to cases when the 
county was the owner, landlord, or lessor. Cf. Little, 836 
F.2d at 796 (acknowledging an insurer's "sound business 
reasons" for not wanting to be obligated to defend the 
insured, while rejecting notion that such reasons prove that 
the insurer "succeeded in drafting a policy that 
unambiguously states this intention."). 
 
In sum, both National and the county "offer reasonable, 
though problematic, interpretations" of definition 10(c). 
Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 
127, 129, 130 (Del. 1997) ("We find problems with both 
sides' interpretations. Neither one gives full effect to all of 
the contract language and both could be applied in ways 
that a reasonable person probably would not have 
intended."). And, the case law before us fails to offer 
definitive guidance, but leads us to suspect that definition 
10(c) is ambiguous. This finding is supported by the rules 
of contract construction. Also, in holding that definition 
10(c) is ambiguous, we recognize Delaware's strong 
insistence that insurance companies are accountable for 
confusing policy language. In this case, National had the 
"opportunity and responsibility to state the terms of its 
coverage . . . in clear and understandable language." Id. at 
130. Thus, because using the tools of contract 
interpretation leads to two reasonable interpretations of the 
"by or on behalf of" language in definition 10(c), we hold 
that it is ambiguous. 
 
Finally, because the District Court did not reach the 
issue of whether the Acierno actions stated a claim for an 
invasion, we decline to reach that issue on appeal. See 
Selected Risks, 718 F.2d at 69 (stating that generally this 
Court will not consider an issue not passed upon by the 
court below). Thus, we will not address the county's 
argument that the nature of Acierno's claims is consistent 
with an invasion of the right of private occupancy. Nor will 
we address National's response that the invasion offense is 
limited to landlord-tenant scenarios and situations that 
involve tangible interference with a possessory interest in 
land. Such arguments go to the nature of the invasion 
offense itself and are outside of our scope of review. We 
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leave it to the District Court to determine whether invasions 
are limited to the landlord-tenant context and whether they 
are limited to tangible interference with possessory interest. 
The District Court will examine them on remand when it 
decides whether the claims made in the Acierno actions 
constitute an "invasion of the right of private occupancy." 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the District 
Court judgment finding that definition 10(c) is 
unambiguous will be reversed. The case will be vacated and 
remanded to the District Court to determine whether the 
Acierno actions constitute an invasion of the right of private 
occupancy. 
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